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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court jurisdiction to consider an appeal pursuant to a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari arises under 78A-3-102(5), Utah Code Ann. (2009) and Title VII, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court granted Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
November 23, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issue presented was stated in the Order granting the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
as follows: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the District Court improperly 
refused to consider extrinsic evidence in granting petitioner's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. 
Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Association squarely presented the stated issue 
to the Court of Appeals in the brief of appellant at page 2 and as shown by the discussion of 
that issue by the Utah Court of Appeals in their opinion of Equine Assisted Growth and 
Learning Association v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, 2009 UT App 200,216 P. 3d 
971. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Plaintiffs claim the following controls resolution of the issues presented: 
A. Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Thatcher, 2007 UT App 183, 164 PJd 445 
B. Green v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2005 UT App 564, 127 P.3d 1279 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action for breach of contract brought by an insured against an insurer for 
denial of a defense under the applicable insurance policy for an underlying lawsuit brought 
against the insured. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
This action was originally filed on July 26, 2007. (R. at p. 1 and Complaint, 
Addendum "A"). Defendants Carolina Casualty Company and Monitor Liability brought a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. (R. at p. 73). The parties later stipulated to dismiss 
defendant Monitor Liability Managers, Inc. (R. at p. 229). Thereafter, the motion went 
forward for Carolina Casualty Company alone. After appropriate briefing and oral argument 
the District Court granted defendant's motion on February 27, 2008. (R. at p. 250). The 
Notice of Appeal was filed on March 25, 2008. (R. at p. 254). The appeal was referred to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. (R. at p. 260). After appropriate briefing and oral argument the 
Court of Appeals issued its opinion on July 23, 2009. Addendum "B". Carolina Casualty 
Company thereafter filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on August 24,2009 and this court 
granted the petition on November 23, 2009. 
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C. Disposition in Trial Court 
In a memorandum decision dated February 27,2008, the Third District Court granted 
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings whereby a determination was made that 
the defendant insurer owed no duty to the insured plaintiff to provide a defense and insurance 
coverage for a certain lawsuit. (R. at p. 250 and Addendum "CO-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A, The Players 
Carolina Casualty Insurance Company is a Florida insurer that issued a Non-Profit 
Organization Liability Insurance policy at issue. (R. at p. 27 and Addendum UD"). Carolina 
Casualty was the defendant in the action at the district court level with a third party 
administrator, Monitor Liability Manager, Inc., that was later dismissed from the action. (R. 
at pp. 1 & 241). Carolina Casualty is here designated as the appellant pursuant to a granted 
Petition for Certiorari as directed in Rule 51(b)(4), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
though Carolina Casualty prevailed at the district court. 
Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Association (EAGALA) is a Utah non-profit 
corporation that is the insured under the policy at issue and the plaintiff in the district court. 
(R.atp. 1). 
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Greg Kersten ("Kersten") was a founder, initial trustee, Chairman of the Board, 
President and CEO of EAGALA whose employment was terminated by the Board of 
Directors on November 16, 2005. (R. at p. 2). 
B. The Policy 
The policy at issue is found in the record on pages 27-40 and reproduced in the 
Addendum "D". This policy is generally titled a Non-Profit Organization Liability Insurance 
Policy. The insureds are defined as the insured entity and individual insureds. (R. at p. 35). 
The policy goes on to define individual insureds as follows: 
D "Individual Insured(s)" means any past, present or future duly elected 
or appointed directors, trustees, officers, employees . . . of the Insured 
Entity. 
The insurance coverage provided is found at page 1 of the policy under "I. Insuring 
Agreement" which provides in relevant part: 
This Policy shall pay on behalf of the Insureds all Loss that the Insureds shall 
become legally obligated to pay, arising from any Claim first made against the 
Insureds during the Policy Period and reported to the Insurer in writing.. 
As is typical with insurance policies, there are some exclusions to coverage. The 
exclusions are found on page 3 (R. at p. 36) of the policy at IV. Exclusions, which provides 
in relevant part: 
The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in connection 
with any Claim made against an Insured: 
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F. by, on behalf, or in the right of the Insured Entity; provided, 
however, this exclusion does not apply to any Claim that is a 
derivative action . . . (R. at pp. 35-37). 
The policy provides specifically for the duty to defend lawsuits against the insured. 
That duty arises in VI. Defense, Cooperation and Settlements found at page 5 (R. at p. 38) 
of the policy. The relevant provision is as follows: 
B. The Insurer shall have the right and the duty to defend any 
Claim to which this insurance applies, even if any allegations of 
the Claim are groundless, false, or fraudulent.. . 
A review of the record will show that there have been no allegations of ambiguity and 
the parties appear to have taken their positions with a mutual understanding of the terms of 
the policy. That is, there is a duty to defend any claim to which the insurance applies. 
C. Relevant Events. 
On November 17,2005, the day after he was fired, Kersten filed a complaint against 
the Board of Directors of EAGALA in the name of EAGALA. (R. at p. 9 and Addendum 
*
;E"). The action was brought listing a number of alleged wrongful acts by the directors with 
respect to the corporation. The causes of action in that complaint are not artfully drafted but 
the Prayer for Relief at Record, pp. 19-20 is instructive. The Prayer asks for monetary 
damages in favor of EAGALA, injunctive relief for alleged wrongful acts, and a recognition 
that Kersten really is still a corporate director, president, and CEO. 
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Of significance is the fact that the Fourth District Court in which the Kersten 
complaint was filed issued a temporary restraining order preserving Kersten as a corporate 
officer and then dissolved that order a short time later. (R. at pp. 23-25). 
EAGALA presented the Kersten lawsuit to Carolina Casualty for coverage and 
defense. Carolina Casualty determined that there was not coverage because of exclusion F 
and resultantly, no duty to defend. That decision was clearly made in light of existing Utah 
case law on the point as reflected in a letter from the insurer. (R. at pp. 42-44). The Kersten 
action was later dismissed when the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and the plaintiff 
simply filed a notice of dismissal. (R. at p. 147). There was never a ruling on the merits of 
the Kersten complaint. EAGALA then filed the action against Carolina Casualty which is 
the subject of this appeal. (R. at p. 1). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court ruled correctly that the circumstances of this case did not require any 
resort to extrinsic evidence to determine the insurer's duty to defend. The Court of Appeals 
took dicta from Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate ofTherkelsen and converted it into hard 
law that cannot be applied to the facts of this case. This court should hold to the current Utah 
law that the duty to defend is determined by reading the policy and the complaint and 
determining if coverage could be found should the plaintiff prevail. 
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This court should either not apply Therkelsen to these circumstances or should 
recognize the case should be overruled or modified where the dicta concerning extrinsic 
evidence and fixing the duty to defend does not present a workable rule for insurers and 
insureds. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Applicable Law 
A, Introduction 
There have been no disputed material facts in this litigation. In fact, this lawsuit was 
resolved by a motion for judgment on the pleadings which, by definition, is restricted to the 
facts in the pleadings of the case. What follows is an objective statement of the law 
applicable in Utah to the duty to defend of an insurer followed by some comments of where 
the Utah Court of Appeals went wrong in its analysis resulting in leaving a number of 
significant questions for insurers generally in the future as they determine their duty to 
defend. 
B. Duty to Defend 
Insurance policies are considered under Utah law to be contracts between the insurer 
and the insured. First American Title Insurance Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834 (Utah 
1998). As explained in J.B. Ranch, if the policy is not ambiguous the policy language should 
be construed according to its plain and ordinary language. Also, parties can include terms 
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they believe appropriate including exclusions to coverage. See also, Quaid v. U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc., 2007 UT 27, 158 P.3d 525. 
Utah law has been well settled that an insurer determines its duty to defend an insured 
for a claim made by comparing two documents. Those documents are the complaint and the 
insurance policy. Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Thatcher, 2007 UT App 183, 164 P.3d 445. In 
making the comparison of the complaint to the insurance policy the merits of the litigation 
against the insured are to be disregarded. Green v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2005 
UT App 564, 127 P.3d 1279. Green makes clear that even if the allegations of the 
underlying suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent, the determination of the duty to defend 
is focused on what is sought to be recovered and the legal basis for that recovery. Extrinsic 
evidence has been irrelevant where the allegations of the complaint are clear and the 
insurance policy is clear. Should there be any conceivable way that coverage could attach 
to the claim should the plaintiff prevail then the duty to defend follows. 
The process for determining the duty to defend appeared to the Utah Court of Appeals 
to be expanded by Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate ofTherkelsen, 2001 UT 48, 27 P.3d 
555. There, a plaintiff that had been shot brought an action for personal injury against the 
estate of the later deceased man who shot him. The homeowner's insurer denied coverage 
but provided a defense under a reservation of rights. The defense was terminated after the 
insurer filed a declaratory judgment action in which the district court determined that there 
8 
was not a duty to defend because there was not coverage for an intentional act. Some 
discovery had been done in that action. 
The Utah Supreme Court looked at issues of coverage and the duty to defend. The 
trial court had looked at deposition testimony from the plaintiff and a police officer in 
determining there was not a duty to defend. The estate took the position that the trial court 
should have followed the majority rule that one looks to the language of the policy and the 
complaint to determine the duty to defend. Unlike here, the insured there was arguing that 
the trial court should not look at extrinsic evidence. 
This court recognized in Therkelsen the majority rule that an insurer's duty to defend 
is determined by comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations in the 
complaint. 2001 UT 48 at f 21. This court went on to affirm the longtime rule that insurers 
have a duty to defend any complaint alleging facts which, if proven, will render the insurer 
liable for indemnification of its insured citing Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 
1255 (UT App 1994). The court went on to say that despite that general rule, a duty to 
defend turns on the contractual terms of the insurance policy on the point. The court said: 
f 25 [ W]hether extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine whether an insurer 
has a duty to defend an insured turns on the party's contractual terms. If the 
parties make the duty to defend dependant on the allegations against the 
insured, extrinsic evidence is irrelevant to a determination of whether a duty 
to defend exists. However, if, for example, the parties make the duty to defend 
dependant on whether there is actually a "covered claim or suit," extrinsic 
evidence would be relevant to a determination of whether a duty to defend 
exists. 2001UT48atT[25. 
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Therkelsen was remanded to consider extrinsic evidence under the language of the 
policy at issue in that case. Therkelsen was not read by other courts to create a significant 
shift in the law concerning the duty to defend. SeeJ.R. Simplot Co. v. Chevron Pipeline Co., 
2006 WL 279 6887 (D. Utah), wherein the federal court discusses, at pages 13-14, in an 
unreported decision, an extensive review of the duty to defend under Utah law and concludes 
that the law remains that the duty to defend is determined by reference to the allegations in 
the underlying complaint. Similarly, subsequent to Therkelsen, Green v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 2005 UT App 564, 127 P.3d 1279, recognized the long standing rule that the 
duty to defend is determined by comparing the language of the policy to the allegations of 
the complaint. Similarly, in Benjamin v. Arnica Mutual Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37,140 P.3d 1210, 
this court applied Therkelsen to a duty to defend issue still recognizing the general rule to 
compare the policy with the allegations of the underlying complaint. This court therein refers 
to Therkelsen as "an alternative formulation" of the general rule that '"the test is whether the 
complaint alleges a risk within the coverage of the policy." 
Mention should be made that nothing about the recognized rule in determining the 
duty to defend in Utah appears to be outside the majority rule in the nation. See, 22 Holmes' 
Appleman on Insurance 2d, § 136.2 and § 136.3 (2003) wherein comparison of the policy to 
the complaint has been called the "eight corners" rule. Appleman explains the duty to resort 
to extrinsic evidence in those states which have recognized the duty arises when facts are 
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presented to the insurer by the insured that are not contained in the complaint suggesting 
coverage may attach. This extrinsic evidence position, recognized by Appleman as a 
minority position, is grounded in an attempt to insure that the duty to defend follows 
coverage where there are extrinsic facts to suggest coverage could still be found. No 
authority has been found to suggest the insurer has a duty to go out and look for facts outside 
of the eight corners to conduct some kind of independent investigation. 
C. The Court of Appeals Decision 
The district court reached its decision of no duty to defend by applying the longtime 
rule of comparing the policy language with the allegations of the Kersten complaint. (R. at 
pp. 250-253). The court found the insured v. insured exclusion would deny coverage. (R. 
at p. 250). The Utah Court of Appeals later reversed in a brief analysis which, in all due 
respect, misapplies Therkelsen by taking the language too far as explained in detail below. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, whose opinion is found at Addendum "B" strictly 
interpreted Therkelsen to impose an actuality requirement. The court stated at ^ 25: 
"Thus, the question in this case is whether the Policy's insured vs. insured 
clause is triggered by the facial language of the complaint or whether the 
clause is triggered by the actual facts underlying the complaint." 
The Court of Appeals then applied an ''actuality" analysis it derived from Therkelsen 
to say that the insurer here had a duty to examine extrinsic facts before denying a defense. 
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IL Duty to Defend Does Not Turn on Extrinsic Evidence Here 
A. Introduction 
Having laid out the facts and law applicable, final attention can now be turned to 
whether Carolina Casualty had the duty to defend by considering extrinsic evidence. 
Appellant argues here that Therkelsen should not be so applied and, if that was the holding 
of Therkelsen, that it ought to be overruled. Such a rule is not pragmatic in the real world 
of insurance and litigation as explained below and does nothing really to promote insureds' 
contract rights under policies. 
B. Therkelsen Should Not Be Applied Here 
As explained above, Carolina Casualty here had the duty under the policy to defend 
any claim to which the ''insurance applies". The insured v. insured exclusion had clear 
application to a suit that carried the name of the insured entity as a plaintiff and where the 
policy defined the personality behind the complaint, Kersten, as an officer or former officer 
to be an insured. The prayer for relief was focused entirely upon giving relief to the insured 
entity. There was nothing contained in the complaint which would suggest in construing the 
complaint in the best light for the insured that the exclusion would not apply. Carolina 
Casualty easily met the requirement of Utah law that upon comparison of the complaint and 
policy there was no suggestion of coverage and a resulting duty to defend. 
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An examination of Therkelsen shows that the Court of Appeals took it too far as 
precedent. Therkelsen was a declaratory judgment action in which discovery was done. The 
trial court there had looked at extrinsic evidence and the insured estate was arguing the trial 
court was bound by the usual rule of comparing policy to complaint. The opinion affirmed 
that the Therkelsen trial court could consider extrinsic evidence because the policy 
specifically limited the duty to defend for uany covered claim or suit" and the trial court 
should look at the extrinsic evidence to determine coverage. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in this case took Therkelsen to create an actuality test. 
That is, if the duty to defend arises where there is actually coverage then that duty is 
determined by a resort to extrinsic evidence to make sure there is coverage. There are 
multiple problems in applying Therkelsen that literally. 
First, the Therkelsen case was remanded because the contract language on the duty 
to defend was not before the court. There was only a discussion of general principles that 
the Court of Appeals has applied to the language of this policy without knowing what the 
Utah Supreme Court would have held had it seen the actual language in the Therkelsen 
policy. Carolina Casualty is being held to a principle of law established in the abstract and 
ends up in this case being the real case of first impression of whether extrinsic evidence must 
be considered in determining a duty to defend. 
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Second, there is a considerable difference in this case because here an insurer made 
the decision to not defend the Kersten lawsuit with no declaratory judgment action pending 
and no discovery done. This decision was made, likely, in the procedural context most 
common to litigation. That is, a lawsuit is filed and the insured requests a defense. The 
insurer read the complaint and applied the policy. To say that in such a circumstance an 
insurer has to do an independent investigation of the underlying facts of the complaint means 
that every time an insurer decides there is no coverage or no duty to defend there has to be 
a declaratory judgment action for no other reason than to conduct discovery to learn the facts. 
That is not a reasonable approach as it drives up costs for all and adds nothing as either the 
insured or the insurer can already bring an action when the dispute is not resolved. 
Third, the Court of Appeals approach of requiring an actual determination of coverage 
by looking at evidence outside of the complaint is not reasonably workable in the real world. 
What the requirement does is force an insurer to have to find evidence and then weigh that 
evidence. Obviously, the evidence supportive of the allegations of the complaint is in the 
hands of the plaintiff with whom the insurer has no relationship. The insurer may learn 
relevant evidence is in the hands of third parties or even other parties in the suit. The insurer 
becomes at once an insurer, an investigator, and a trier of fact. While the long time majority 
and controlling rule that an insurer need only look at the allegations of the complaint and 
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compare it to the policy language may have problems that are commonly associated with line 
drawing, that is much more workable in the real world. 
Right now, an insurance adjuster tl mt receives a coi t: ipla.ii it c at. i look at tl ic policy and 
read the complaint and come to a conclusion about the dut) to defend based on ihat 
comparison. There is no power absent litigation to discover facts from the party that brings 
the lawsuit. One can safely assume that an insured will ilwns »\a\ thai I here are facts 01 itsi.de 
ol (lii- complaint that would invoke coverage. An actuality requirement will also lead to 
circumstances where ultimate resolution of the underlying litigation will show that there 
should have been no coverage where the insurer extender •- defense or- Insic facts that 
were inc< )i i lplete and not reasonably discoverable at the beginning of the litigation. 1 he 
logical extension of that situation is that insurers ought to get refunds where insureds 
received a defense to which they were not entitlec. •. A. ., \pensive ai id unreasonable 
result in the con in ici cial world. 
Next, a strict requirement that an insurer has to go outside of the eight corners really 
does nothing for the insurer or the insured except increase the anioi int. ol li.Iiga.lii n 1 in the 
court system. insured disagrees with the decision not to provide a defense or if an 
insurer has a question of what its duty is, parties can now simply file a lawsuit for declaratory 
or other relief. There is no need to do so in obvious cases like tl lis c n le wl lere the exclusion 
clearly applies.,,. I. he reqi lit en lei it that there be a substantial investigation outside of the eight 
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corners creates a burden on insurers which is unnecessary when there is a remedy if the 
insurer makes a wrong decision already existing. Certainly, every insurer has a duty to act 
in good faith in evaluating the duty to defend. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. U.S. 
Fidelity & Guar Co., 714 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1986). 
Finally, even if one strictly applies Therkelsen as the Court of Appeals did this is not 
the case to make the determination of a requirement for reviewing extrinsic evidence because 
the eight corner rule works fine for this case. The policy here has a clear exclusion that it 
does not cover claims brought by an insured against an insured. The Kersten complaint is 
brought in the name of EAGALA against directors and the Prayer for Relief in the complaint 
asks for relief for EAGALA. There is no claim for monetary damages in favor of Kersten 
personally in the complaint. The adjuster making the decision not to defend in this case was 
also aware that the Fourth District Judge had at least issued a temporary restraining order on 
the verified complaint thereby signaling that there may be some merit to the complaint. The 
insurer here had no reasonable need to revert to an examination of extrinsic evidence because 
it could determine in good faith under the insured vs. insured exclusion that the insurance did 
not apply. Even if the suit was construed in some way to be a suit of Kersten himself the 
definition of individual insured included past officers and directors. 
Also, the record of this case does not establish that even in hindsight there should have 
been a duty to defend. EAGALA has argued at the trial court and before the Court of 
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Appeals if mt the i niderlying lawsuit was dismissed because the claim was being brought by 
someone who did not have authority to act for the insured. The incurable problem with that 
argument is that Kersten was always an individual insured ;;n definition ii. -i ng 
former officers atid ftle Kersten complaint was resolved by a voluntary dismissal with a 
motion pending. While that certainly carries with it some strong implications it does not 
constitute a judgment on the merits. There is no reasonable suggestion on the record this 
woi ild have beei i a cov ered claim. 
In summary, Therkelsen did not consider any specific duty to defend language and the 
interpretation of the Court of Appeals finding a holding that exists only ii1 the abstract sh. 
not be applied to t! lis case. 
C. Therkelsen Should Be Modified or Overruled 
The foregoing analysis showed this court that Therkelsen should not be applied to t his 
case. There is, however, a realistic af • rive resolutioii of tin i IH ai. That resolution is 
to simply recognize Therkelsen did not create a new rule and, to the extent the Court of 
Appeals interprets it as doing so, it should be overruled. 
As explaii led above, the Therkelsen court had before it language concerning the duty 
to indemnify or cover the claim made by the estate. The case was remanded to the trial court 
because the court did not have before it the contractual provisions on the duty to defend. The 
discussion about tl ic policy language ai id t t ic di ity to del. ei id with extrinsic evidence was dicta 
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absent actual policy language to rule upon and the Court of Appeals in its decision in this 
case has turned it into hard law. 
The problem with the strict application of the dicta by the Court of Appeals is that it 
is not reasonably workable in the real world. An insurer has before it the complaint and the 
insurance policy at the time the duty to defend is invoked by the insured. The insurer looks 
at the complaint and makes a good faith determination that the duty is invoked or it is not. 
Even in the minority of jurisdictions discussed in Appleman, above, that require the insurer 
to look at extrinsic evidence, that is done in the context of the insurer being presented with 
facts that the complaint does not contain which would show that coverage exists. That has 
not transpired with respect to the Kersten complaint in presentation to EAGALA. The 
practical effect of the Court of Appeals approach is to require an insurer to conduct an 
investigation with no power of discovery or, at a minimum, file a declaratory judgment 
lawsuit in every case in which it determines it does not have a duty to defend. The facts may 
be in the possession of the plaintiff in the underlying action or in third parties unwilling to 
cooperate. Every decision not to defend is thereby converted to a significant litigation effort 
under this strict Therkelsen interpretation and application. The Court of Appeals has tried 
to wring too much out of Therkelsen when the actual policy language there concerning the 
duty to defend was not actively considered by this court in reaching a decision. 
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This court is respectfully requested to simply not apply Therkelsen to the Carolina 
Casualty and EAGALA situation or to just overrule the application of Therkelsen to the duty 
to defei id 
Carolina Casualty suggests that this court simply stay with the majority rule nationally 
and the existing rule in Utah of looking at the policy and the complaint and determining the 
duty to defend therefrom interpretii i.g all ii i fa 'oi ot tl le insi irecl I 'here is no need to opei 1 
the proverbial pandora's box of determining when extrinsic evidence should be considered, 
how much is enough to invoke the duty to defend, whose version of the facts an insurer must 
adopt whet i tl icre is an. insured, a plaintiff perhaps otl lei defendants, and independei it tl in d 
parties, and so on. 
Yet a third alternative is to modify the application of Therkelsen. As explained above, 
Therkelsen said that extrinsic evidence could be relevant to tl.. ... ermination of the dilty to 
defend. It did not specifically say that it controlled the determination of the duty to defend. 
Therkelsen could retain viability if resort to extrinsic evidence is required where there was 
some ambiguity in the policy language or some other special circumstances where tiv ui bt 
corners rule would not work. Unfortunately, this case presents no ambiguity or special 
circumstances and modification would end up being based again largely on dicta. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
Carolina Casualty asks the Utah Supreme Court to reverse the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals and to affirm the decision of the Third District Court. 
DATED this /Tf*day of January, 2010. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GRE^Olpf/sANDERS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM "A 
COMPLAINT 
Brian S. King, #4610 
James L. Harris, Jr., #8204 
Bradley R. Sidle, #10687 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1739 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1936 
brian@briansking.com 
james@briansking.com 
brad@briansking.com 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EQUINE ASSISTED GROWTH AND 
LEARNING ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and MONITOR LIABILITY 
MANAGERS, INC., 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Association ("EAGALA"), through its 
undersigned counsel, complains and alleges against Defendants Carolina Casualty Insurance Company 
("CCIC) and Monitor Liability Managers, Inc. (Monitor) as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. EAGALA is a domestic non-profit corporation with its principal place of business in the State of 
Utah. 
A-3 
2. On information and belief, CCIC is a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Utah. 
CCIC provides coverage for EAGALA under a non-profit liability policy of insurance ("the 
Policy"). 
3. On information and belief, Monitor is a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Utah. 
It is unclear what the relationship between Monitor and CCIC is in connection with the Policy 
covering EAGALA. However, Monitor is the entity which corresponded with EAGALA in 
connection with this matter. 
4. This is an action brought by EAGALA to recover legal fees incurred in a case brought against it 
by a former employee which EAGALA alleges should have been covered under the terms of the 
Policy. 
5. Jurisdiction is present under U.C.A. §78-3-4 and venue is appropriate pursuant to U.C.A. §78-
13-7. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
6. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 
7. Greg Kersten (Kersten) was a founder, initial trustee, Chairman of the Board, President and CEO 
of EAGALA. 
8. The Board of Directors for EAGALA terminated Kersten's employment with EAGALA on 
November 16, 2005. 
9. Kersten initiated an action on November 17, 2005, captioned Equine Assisted Growth and 
Learning Association, Inc. v. Lynn Thomas, David Currie. Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, 
Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh, and Rhonda Smith, Case No. 
050403512, assigned to Judge Steven L. Hansen in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah 
County, State of Utah ("Kersten Complaint")- A copy of the Kersten Complaint is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
10. The Kersten Complaint was, in fact, a complaint of wrongful termination and was 
inappropriately brought in the named of EAGALA. 
11 Kersten also submitted a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order on the date he filed the 
Kersten Complaint, November 17, 2005. 
12. Kersten had no authority to bring an action in the name of EAGALA on November 17, 2005, as 
his associatioi i 1 villi i EAGALA had been terminated on i! i,e pi ecedii ig day, November 16, 2005. 
13. The individuals named as Defendants in the Kersten Complaint were the members of the 
EAGALA Board of Directors ("the Board"). 
14. Kersten obtained a Temporary Restraining Order ("the TRO") allowing him to obtain control 
over EAGALA property and assets. 
15. The TRO was dissolved on November 23, 2005, and the court ordered, among other things, that 
" . . . Kersten shall cease and desist from communicating or representing to anyone that he is 
entitled to act on behalf of EAGALA and/or that he represents EAGALA's interests." A copy of 
the November 23, 2005, Order, entitled "Order Dissolving Temporary Restraining Order, 
Returning Defendants to Status Quo Ante the Temporary Restraining Order and Denial of 
Preliminary Injunction" is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
3
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16. The CCIC Policy providing coverage to EAGALA was in effect at the time Kersten 
inappropriately and without authority filed the Kersten Complaint. A copy of the CCIC Policy is 
attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
17. The Policy provides coverage for ''Costs of Defense" defined as: 
[Reasonable and necessary fees, costs and expenses . . .resulting 
solely from the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of 
any Claim against the Insureds . . . . 
Policy, p. 1. 
18. Some time in late 2005 or early 2006, EAGALA and/or its counsel contacted Monitor and 
notified it of the Kersten Complaint. EAGALA requested that Monitor and/or the Policy 
provide coverage for the costs of defense for the defendants in that action, the members 
of the Board. 
19. On March 2, 2006, Monitor sent a letter to EAGALA's counsel, Gabrielle Caruso 
("Caruso") informing her that Monitor and/or the Policy would not provide coverage for 
the costs of defense based on its assertion that an exclusion in the Policy applied. The 
exclusion states: 
The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in 
connection with any Claim made against an Insured: 
F. by, on behalf of, or in the right of the Insured Entity; 
provided, however, this exclusion does not apply to any 
Claim that is a derivative action brought or maintained on 
behalf of the Insured Entity, but only if such Claim is 
instigated and continued totally independent of, and totally 
without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active 
participation of, or intervention of any Individual Insured or 
the Insured Entity. 
4
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Policy, p. 4. 
20. Monitor asserted Kersten was an Individual Insured, and had filed suit "on behalf of, or in 
the right of, EAGALA, Inc." A copy of Monitor's March 2, 2006, letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit D. 
21. Caruso responded in a letter dated M,-.' ii IO, 2006, in wh:.-1 -h ' ^LH- • -Kersten 
was not an Individual Insured as his employment with EAGALA had terminated prior to 
the filing of the Kersten Complaint and Caruso reiterated her denial id tl tat Monitor and/or 
the Policy cover the costs of defense for the Board in defending against Kersten. A copy 
of the March 16, 2006, letter is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
22. Monitor responded in a letter dated May 3, 2006, in which it stated that it need not 
consider any extrinsic evidence in making its decision to deny coverage for the costs of 
defense. Rather, Monitor claimed that "the insurer's duty to defend is dependent upon 
the allegations in the complaint rather than on extrinsic evidence" (emphasis in original). 
A copy of the May 3, 2006, letter is attached hereto as Exhibit F. 
23. In late 2006, the Board retained the law firm of Brian S. King ("King firm") to assist with 
the claim against CCIC and/or Monitor for coverage of the costs of defense incurred in 
defending against the Kersten Complaint. 
24. James Harris ("Harris"), an attorney at the King firm, wrote a letter dated January 19, 
2007, and provided additional arguments as to why CCIC and/or Monitor should provide 
coverage for the costs of defense in the matter involving the Kersten Complaint. A copy 
of the January 19, 2007, letter is attached hereto as Exhibit G. 
25. Monitor responded to Harris' January, 2007 letter in a letter dated January 23, 2007, and 
maintained its denial. In the letter, Monitor states that the "legitimacy of [Kersten 
bringing suit under EAGALA's name] is not a condition upon which the exclusion rests." 
A copy of Monitor's January 23, 2007 letter is attached hereto as Exhibit H. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract) 
26. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth 
herein. 
27. The actions of the Defendants in failing to pay the amounts owed under the Contract 
between the parties constitutes a breach of the Contract. 
28. EAGALA has been damaged as a result of the Defendants' violation ot the Contract in an 
amount exceeding $60,000.00. 
29. EAGALA is entitled to payment for its costs of defense in connection with the Kersten 
Complaint, together with an award of pre-judgment interest and an award of attorney fees 
as foreseeable consequential damages of the Defendants' violation of the Contract. 
WHEREFORE EAGALA prays for judgment against the Defendants on its Cause of 
Action for judgment in an amount to be determined at trial, representing the appropriate and 
reasonable amount owed for EAGALA's costs of defense in connection with the Kersten 
Complaint, an award of attorney fees in connection with the bringing of this action as foreseeable 
consequential damages arising out of the violations of the Contract, an award of pre-judgment 
6 A-8 
interest, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-1, and for such further relief as the Court 
deems equitable in the premises. 
DATED this jLjday of July, 2007. 
Plaintiffs Address: 
Santaquin, UT 
James L. Harris, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
7
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ADDENDUM "B 
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
A l l 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Equine Assisted Growth and 
Learning Association, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Carolina Casualty Insurance 
Company, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
OPINION 
[For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20080277-CA 
F I L E D 
( J u l y 2 3 , 2009) 
2009 UT App 2001 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 070910789 
The Honorable Robert P. Faust 
Attorneys: James L. Harris Jr., Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Gregory J. Sanders and Patrick C. Burt, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Thorne, Davis, and McHugh. 
THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge: 
i|l Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Association (EAGALA) 
appeals from the district court's dismissal of its action against 
Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (Carolina Casualty), the 
issuer of EAGALA's non-profit organization liability insurance 
policy (the Policy). We reverse the district court's order and 
remand the matter for further proceedings. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 In November 2005, Greg Kersten, a former EAGALA employee, 1 
sued the individual members of EAGALA's board of trustees, 
seeking monetary and injunctive relief. Although Kersten's 
complaint was captioned as if the plaintiff was EAGALA itself and 
was verified by Kersten as "President and CEO" of EAGALA, Kersten 
further details about the termination of Kersten's 
employment with EAGALA, as well as other background facts, may be 
found in EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Services, 2 0 07 
UT App 43, 157 P.3d 334. See id^ 11 2-6. 
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m fact had no authority to sue on EAGALA's behalf at the time 
the complaint was filed. Kersten briefly obtained a temporary 
restraining order giving him control of EAGALA before the board 
members could demonstrate to the district court that Kersten was 
no longer affiliated with EAGALA and had no standing to sue m 
its name. The district court dissolved the temporary restraining 
order upon the board members1 showing, and Kersten ultimately 
dismissed the case.2 EAGALA incurred substantial costs defending 
itself and its board members against Kersten's miscaptioned suit. 
i|3 EAGALA notified Carolina Casualty of Kersten's complaint and 
requested coverage for the costs of its defense. However, 
Carolina Casualty denied coverage. The Policy excludes from 
coverage claims brought "by, on behalf of, or in the right of 
[EAGALA]" (the insured versus insured clause), and Carolina 
Casualty claimed that the Kersten complaint was such an excluded 
claim because it was captioned m EAGALA's name. Carolina 
Casualty maintained its denial of coverage even after EAGALA 
informed it that Kersten had no relationship with EAGALA at the 
time of the suit. EAGALA then brought this suit against Carolina 
Casualty to establish coverage for the costs of defending against 
Kersten's unsuccessful suit. 
f4 Carolina Casualty sought judgment on the pleadings, arguing 
that on the face of its initiating complaint, Kersten's suit fell 
within the terms of the insured versus insured clause. EAGALA 
sought to introduce extrinsic evidence to demonstrate that 
Kersten had no authority to sue in EAGALA's name and that 
Kersten's suit was therefore not "by, on behalf of, or in the 
right of" EAGALA, but the district court concluded that such 
evidence could not be considered. The district court then 
compared the language of the Kersten complaint to the language of 
the insured versus insured clause and, finding that the Kersten 
complaint fell within the scope of the clause, granted judgment 
on the pleadings to Carolina Casualty. EAGALA appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1(5 EAGALA argues that judgment on the pleadings was 
inappropriate in light of EAGALA's proffered extrinsic evidence 
demonstrating that the Kersten complaint was brought "by, on 
behalf of, or in the right of" Kersten individually, rather than 
"by, on behalf of, or in the right of" EAGALA. Whether judgment 
9Kersten thereafter filed a wrongful termination suit 
against EAGALA in his own name, alleging many of the same facts 
and theories of relief that he pleaded m his original complaint. 
Kersten's second suit is irrelevant to the outcome of this case, 
and all of the references in the body of this opinion are to 
Kersten's first suit brought in EAGALA's name. 
20080277-CA 2 
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on the pleadings was appropriate in this case depends on whether 
the district court erred m failing to consider EAGALA's 
extrinsic evidence. This issue presents a question of law that 
we review for correctness. Cf. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Therkelsen, 
2001 UT 48, H 26, 27 P.3d 555 (implying that appellate 
determination of extrinsic evidence question is appropriate if 
contractual language is in the record). 
ANALYSIS 
%6 EAGALA argues that the district court erred by refusing to 
consider extrinsic evidence that EAGALA had offered m opposition 
to Carolina Casualty's motion for judgment on the pleadings. In 
Fire Insurance Exchange v. Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, 27 P.3d 555, 
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the circumstances under which 
extrinsic evidence must be considered, and when it may not be, m 
determining whether an insurance company has the duty to defend 
an insured against a claim. See id. fU 20-26. The Therkelsen 
court stated: 
[W]hether extrinsic evidence is admissible to 
determine whether an insurer has a duty to 
defend an insured turns on the parties' 
contractual terms. If the parties make the 
duty to defend dependent on the allegations 
against the insured, extrinsic evidence is 
irrelevant to a determination of whether a 
duty to defend exists. However, if, for 
example, the parties make the duty to defend 
dependent on whether there is actually a 
"covered claim or suit," extrinsic evidence 
would be relevant to a determination of 
whether a duty to defend exists. 
Id. i| 25 (second emphasis added) . Thus, the question m this 
case is whether the Policy's insured versus insured clause is 
triggered by the facial language of a complaint or whether the 
clause is triggered by the actual facts underlying the complaint. 
^7 The insured versus insured clause states that Carolina 
Casualty will not be liable for either indemnification or defense 
of claims made "by, on behalf of, or in the right of [EAGALA]. "3 
3At oral argument, there was some question as to whether a 
suit by Kersten individually would also trigger the insured 
versus insured clause because Kersten, as a former employee, also 
qualifies as an "Insured" under the Policy. It appears that this 
is not a concern, because the Policy differentiates between the 
"Insured Entity," defined as EAGALA itself, and "Individual 
(continued...) 
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The listed circumstances triggering the clause constitute 
objective facts, the truth or falsity of which are not determined 
solely by the allegations, or in this case, the captioning, of 
the Kersten complaint.4 To paraphrase Therkelsen, the parties' 
contract has made Carolina Casualty's duty to defend dependent on 
whether the Kersten complaint "is actually" a claim "by, on 
behalf of, or in the right of" EAGALA, and extrinsic evidence is 
therefore relevant to a determination of whether a duty to defend 
exists. See 2001 UT 48, 1 25. Accordingly, it was error for the 
district court to refuse to consider the extrinsic evidence 
proffered by EAGALA in opposition to Carolina Casualty's motion. 
CONCLUSION 
%8 We hold that the district court erred when it failed to 
consider extrinsic evidence in applying the Policy's insured 
versus insured clause. Accordingly, we reverse the district 
court's order dismissing EAGALA's action and remand this matter 
for further proceedings. 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
19 WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
3(...continued) 
Insured(s)," defined as including "past, present[, and] future 
. . employees" of EAGALA. The insured versus insured clause 
only excludes claims by the Insured Entity, i.e., EAGALA. 
4Notably, the insured versus insured clause does not include 
the language that perhaps most accurately describes the Kersten 
complaint--that it was brought "in the name of" EAGALA. Nor does 
the clause contain language such as "purporting to be brought" 
that might render the captioning of the Kersten complaint 
determinative on its face. 
20080277-CA 4 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EQUINE ASSISTED GROWTH AND : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
LEARNING ASSOCIATION, 
: CASE NO. 070910789 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and MONITOR LIABILITY : 
MANAGERS, INC., 
Defendants. 
This case came before the Court for a hearing on February 5, 2007, 
in connection with the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement to further consider the relevant legal authority cited by the 
parties and counsel's oral argument. Being now fully informed, the Court 
rules as stated herein. 
The core issue presented by the Defendants' Motion is whether the 
allegations, as set forth in the Complaint filed in the underlying 
lawsuit ("Original Complaint"), created a duty for the Plaintiff's 
insurer (Carolina Casualty) to defend. Carolina argues that since the 
Original Complaint was filed in the Plaintiff's name against members of 
its board, this was a clear case of insured versus insured and subject 
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to an exclusion in the Plaintiff's insurance policy. The Plaintiff 
counters that the Defendants should have delved further and, if they had 
done so, they would have learned that the Original Complaint was filed 
by Greg Kersten after he had already resigned as the Plaintiff's CEO. 
The issue in this case turns on whether the Court should look to 
extrinsic evidence to determine whether Carolina Casualty had a duty to 
defend. The Defendants argue that the Court should look only to the 
Original Complaint and the insurance policy. The Plaintiff argues that 
extrinsic evidence may be allowed to assess whether a duty existed. The 
Plaintiff further argues that if the extrinsic evidence is examined, it 
will support a finding that Greg Kersten had no authority or right to 
bring a lawsuit in the Plaintiff's name. The Defendants counter that 
reviewing extrinsic evidence is the exception, not the rule. 
After considering the parties' respective legal arguments, the Court 
determines that the Defendants' Motion is well-taken and therefore 
granted. Specifically, the Defendant correctly observes that the general 
rule is that in order to discern whether a duty to defend exists requires 
a court to examine the allegations in the underlying Complaint in light 
of the relevant policy language. The exception to that rule, as narrowly 
outlined in the case of Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen, 
27 P.3d 555, 561 (Utah 2001), permits extrinsic evidence in the limited 
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circumstances where the policy language makes "the duty to defend 
dependent on whether there is actually a 'covered claim or suit. . ." 
In the face of such language, there is a potential of the court being 
"unable to determine whether the claim or suit was 'covered' by the 
policy." The Court agrees with the Defendants that a plain reading of 
the Original Complaint in light of the specific policy exclusion at 
issue, leaves no doubt that the underlying lawsuit falls within the ambit 
of the exclusion. Indeed, the Court is fully capable of determining that 
no legal theory or allegations asserted in the Original Complaint would 
be covered by the policy. Extrinsic evidence is therefore unnecessary 
and, in fact, it would be improper for the Court to consider such 
evidence under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this JL ~?JLA day of February, 2008. 
\kk=wL 
ROBERT P. FAUS 
DISTRICT COURT Ji 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this. _day of 
February, 2 008: 
Brian S. King 
James L. Harris, Jr. 
Bradley R. Sidle 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gregory J. Sanders 
Patrick C. Burt 
Attorneys for Defendant Monitor Liability 
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM "D" 
POLICY 
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Carolina Casualty Insurance Company 
4500 Touchton Road East, Building 100, Suite 400, Jacksonville, FL 32246 Declarat ions P&QG 
Non-Profit Organization Liability Insurance 
CLAIMS MADE WARNING FOR DECLARATIONS 
NOTICE: THIS POLICY PROVIDES COVERAGE ON A CLAIMS MADE AND REPORTED BASIS SUBJECT TO ITS TERMS. 
THIS POLICY APPLIES ONLY TO ANY "CLAIM" FIRST MADE AGAINST THE INSUREDS AND REPORTED TO THE 
INSURER DURING THE POLICY PERIOD, THE AUTOMATIC EXTENDED REPORTING PERIOD, OR THE PURCHASED 
EXTENDED REPORTING PERIOD, 
PLEASE READ AND REVIEW THE POLICY CAREFULLY AND DISCUSS THE COVERAGE WITH YOUR INSURANCE AGENT 
OR BROKER. 
Whenever printed in this Declarations Page, the boldface type terms shall have the same meanings as indicated in the Policy 
Policy Form- HP 23200 (08-99) Policy Number: 3667707 / 1 
Kern 1 Name and Address of Named Insured: 
Equine Assisted Growth & Learning Association (EAGALA) 
11459 West Highway 6 
Elberta, UT 84626 
Person designated to receive all correspondence from the Insurer: 
Lynn Thomas 
Executive Director 
item 2 Policy Period: From September 15,2005 (inception date) to September t5,2006 (expiration date) 
(Both dates at 12 01 am Standard Time at the address of the Named Insured) 
Item 3 Limits of Liability for the Policy Period (inclusive of Damages only): 
A $1,000,000 each Claim, but in no event exceeding 
B $1,000,000 in the aggregate for all Claims 
Item 4 Applicable Deductible: $1,000 
tem 5 Premium: $920 
tern 6 Endorsements attached: 
230225 Utah Amendatory Endorsement 
234350 Addition to Section IV Professional Services Exclusion 
234400 Addition to Section IV Copyright Patent Infringement Exclusion 
234900 Addition to Section IV Certified Acts of Terrorism Exclusion 
$m7 Notice to the Insurer as provided in sections VII A and VII B and any information furnished to the Insurer as provided in section VI A 
shall be sent to: Monitor Liability Managers, inc , Claims Department, 
Address: 2850 West Golf Road, Suite 800, Rolling Meadows, II. 60008-4039 
Fax: (847)806-4017 
Email: newclaim@monitorliability.com 
All other notices required to be given to the Insurer under this Policy shall oe sent to: Monitor Liability Managers, Inc 
Address: 2850 West Golf Road, Suite 800, Rolling Meadows, IL 60008-4039 
Fax: (847)806-6282 
,** Declarations along with tne completed and signed Proposal Form and the Non-profit Organization Liability Insurance Policy, shali constitute the 
ract between the Named lnsured#nd the Insurer 
horized Representative: y / /K(^Mfo Date issued: September 27,2005 
23201 (rev 07-05) / ' Page 1 of 2 
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uarouna uasuaiiy insurance uompany Pase 1 of ] 
4600 Touchton Road East, Building 100, Suite 400, Jacksonville, FL 32246 
Utah 
Amendatory Endorsement 
Section III Definitions C "Damages" is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 
111 C : "Damages" means a monetary judgment (including back pay and front pay), award or settlement, pre-judgment interest and 
post-judgment interest; provided, however, Damages shall not include: 
1 taxes (provided, however, that the Insurer will reimburse an Insured Entity for any employer share of payroll 
taxes on any portion of damages or settlements which constitute backpay otherwise considered Damages), civil or 
criminal fines, or penalties imposed by law, or 
2 payment of insurance, disability, pension, health or other plan benefits claimed by or on behalf of any Individual 
Insured, or that a claimant would have been entitled to as an Individual Insured had the Named Insured 
provided the Claimant with a continuation of insurance, or 
3. costs incurred by any Insured to make any building or property more accessible or accommodating to any 
disabled person, or 
4 amounts owed under federal, state or local wage and hour laws, provided, however, Damages shall include 
amounts owed under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, or 
5 commissions, bonuses, profit sharing or severance payment, or 
6 future wages or benefits of any reinstated Individual Insured or wages or benefits associated with the continued 
employment of an Individual Insured, or 
7 any matter deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this Policy shall be construed 
Section VII Notice of Claim and Multiple Claims is amended by the addition of the following: 
VII: Failure to give any notice or file any proof of loss required by the Policy within the time specified in the Policy does not 
invalidate a claim made by the Insured, if the Insured shows that it was not reasonably possible to give the notice or file 
the proof of loss within the prescribed time and that notice was given or proof of loss filed as soon as reasonably possible 
Section VIH General Conditions G is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 
Vlll G.: By acceptance of this Policy, the Insureds and the insurer agree that this Policy and, so long as they are attached hereto, 
the Proposal Form (including any documents submitted with, physically attached to and thereby made part of the Proposal 
Form), and any written endorsements constitute the entire agreement between the parties 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Policy or in any written endorsement attached thereto, only the Policy and ^such 
documents as are physically attached to the Policy at the time of its delivery shall be part of the agreement between the parties 
Whenever printed in this Endorsement, the boldface type terms shall have the same meanings as inaicated in the Policy Form All other provisions of 
3 Policy remain unchanged. 
f insured 
Equine Assisted Growth & Learning Association (EAGALA) 
Effective Date of This Endorsement 
09/15/2005 
Policy Number 
3667707/1 
Authorized Representative i 
NP 23200 (08-99) 9245-667707-369257 230225 (08-99) 
Carolina Casualty Insurance Company 
4600 Touchton Road East Building 100 Suite 400 Jacksonville, FL 32246 
Page 1 of 1 
Addition to Section IV. 
Professional Services Exclusion 
In consideration of the premium paid for this Policy, it is understood and agreed that section IV Exclusions of this Policy is amended oy the 
addition of the following 
IV based upon, arising out of directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any way involving the performance of any 
professional services for others for a fee, and caused by any act, error or omission 
Whenever printed m this Endorsement the boldface type terms shall have the same meanings as indicated in the Policy Form All other provisions of 
e Policy remain unchanged 
Insured 
Equine Assisted Growth & Learning Association (EAGALA) 
Effective Date of This Endorsement 
09/15'2005 
Policy Number 
3667707/1 
Authorized Representative | 
NP 23200 (08 99) 9405 667707 369257 234350(08 99) 
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Carolina Casualty Insurance Company Page 1 of 1 
4600 Touchton Road East, Building 100, Suite 400, Jacksonville, FL 32246 
Addition to Section IV. 
Copyright/ Patent Infringement Exclusion 
In consideration of the premium paid for this Policy, it is understood and agreed that: 
1 Section IV Exclusions of this Policy is amended by the addition of the following: 
IV: based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any way involving any actual or 
alleged: 
1 plagiarism, or 
2. infringement of copyright, patent, title or slogan, or 
3 piracy or unfair competition, or 
4. idea misappropriation, or 
5 any other intellectual property rights 
2 Section III Definitions L "Personal Injury" of this Policy is amended by the addition of the following: 
III L: "Personal Injury" means any actual or alleged defamation, invasion of privacy, wrongful entry, eviction, false arrest, false 
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution 
Whenever printed in this endorsement, the boldface type terms shall have the same meanings as indicated in the Policy Form All other provisions of 
* Policy remain unchanged 
Insured 
Equine Assisted Growth & Learning Association (EAGALA) 
Effective Date of This Endorsement 
09/15/2005 
Policy Number 
3667707/1 
Authorized Representative j 
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Addition to Section IV. 
Certified Acts of Terrorism Exclusion 
In consideration of the premium paid for this Policy it is understood and agreed that 
1 Section IV Exclusions or this Policy is amended by the addition of the following 
IV based upon arising out or, directly or indirectly resulting from o- in consequence of or in any way involving any injury or 
damage arising out of a Certified Act of Terrorism 
2 Solely for the purposes of tne provisions of this endorsement section III Definitions of this Policy is amended by the addition of the 
following 
III Certified Act of Terrorism means an act that is certified by the Secretary of the Treasury, in concurrence with the 
Secretary of State and the Attorney General of the United States to be an act of terrorism pursuant to the federal 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
The federal Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 sets forth ihe following criteria for a Certified Act of Terrorism 
a The act resulted in aggregate losses in excess of $5 million and 
b The act is a violent act or an act that is dangerous to human life, property or infrastructure and is committed by 
an individual or individuals acting on oehalf of any foreign person or foreign interest as part of an effort to coerce 
the civilian population of the United States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United States 
Government by coercion 
Whenever printed in tnis Endorsement the boldface type terms shall have the same meanings as indicated in tne Do!icy Form All other provisions of 
he Policy remain unchanged 
Insured 
Equine Assisted Growtn & Learning Association (EAGALA) 
Effective Date of This Endorsement 
09/15/2005 
Policy Number 
3667707/1 
Authorized Representative 
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EMI^OYMENT PRACTICES IBSS PREVENTION HOTHNE 
What Is the Hotline? 
You're facing a potential human resources problem. 
What will you do7 How should you deal with the issue? 
It is difficult for employers to stay informed regarding 
employment laws. With Monicor's Employment 
Practices Loss Prevention Hot l ine, you are not alone. 
As a professional liability customer, you have immediate 
access to experts in the employment practices loss 
prevention fields. 
Who Are the Experts? 
Monitor Liability Managers. Inc. has selected Jackson 
Lewis LLP as hotline counsel. Jackson Lewis LLP is one 
of the largest and most respected employee relation 
advisors in the country. And you have direct access 
to them. 
How Do I Use the Service? 
Lach insured should identify one point person who will 
have access to the 800 number to discuss general 
employment law issues or to evaluate specific 
employment decisions. This point person may contact 
Jackson Lewis LLP at 1-800-220-8966, and be sure and 
identify themselves as a Monitor Liability Managers 
Employment Practices Liability Program policyholder. 
Is the Hotline Confidential? 
An attorney-client relationship exists with regard to 
discussions between insureds and Jackson Lewis 
LLP Therefore, all hotline conversations are kept 
stnctiv confidential. 
Why Do Companies Select Monitor? 
Strength & Stability 
Monitor places coverage only through member 
companies of W. R. Berkley Corporation that are rated 
"A" (Excellent) or better by A.M. Best. 
Expert C la ims Handl ing 
Claims are handled promptly by our professional staff 
of ln-house attorneys. Everything possible is done to 
manage any claim so as to not interrupt your company's 
day-to-day operation 
Experience 
The average experience of our senior underwriting staff 
is over ten years, six of these being with Monitor. This 
level of expertise has allowed us to resolve complicated 
issues quickly and form long-term, solid relationships 
with our customers. 
What Is the Cost? 
As a professional liability customer of Monitor Liability 
Managers, Inc., Jackson Lewis LLP will provide unlimited 
telephone counseling each year at no additional charge. 
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MONITOR 
LIABILITY MANACERS, INC. 
A BERKLEY COMPANY* 
A PARTNER YOU CAN COUNT O N 
MONITOR LIABILITY MANAGERS, INC. 
IS che underwriting manager for the 
CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY •> ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Employment Practices Liability. Management Liability and 
Nonprofit Directors and Officers Liability Programs 
Non-Profit Organization Liability Insurance Policy 
with Employment Practices Liability 
Carolina Casualty 
'nsurance Company 
THIS IS A CLAIMS MADE POLICY 
PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY <3 
A-31 
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CLAIMS MADE WARNING FOR POLICY 
NOTICE: THIS POLICY PROVIDES COVERAGE ON A CLAIMS MADE AND REPORTED BASIS SUBJECT TO ITS TERMS. THIS POLICY 
APPLIES ONLY TO ANY "CLAIM" FIRST MADE AGAINST THE INSUREDS AND REPORTED TO THE INSURER DURING THE POLICY 
PERIOD, THE AUTOMATIC EXTENDED REPORTING PERIOD, OR THE PURCHASED EXTENDED REPORTING PERIOD 
PLEASE READ AND REVIEW THE POLICY CAREFULLY AND DISCUSS THE COVERAGE WITH YOUR INSURANCE AGENT OR BROKER 
In consideration of the payment of the premium, in reliance on ail statements in the Proposal and all other information provided to the 
Insurer, and subject to all provisions of this Policy, the Insurer and Insureds agree as follows 
I. Insuring Agreement 
This Policy shall pay on behalf of the Insureds all Loss that the Insureds shall become legally obligated to pay, arising from any Claim first 
made against the Insureds during the Policy Period and reported to the Insurer in writing during the Policy Period, the Automatic Extended 
Reporting Period, or the Extended Reporting Period (if applicable) for any Wrongful Act 
II. Extended Reporting Period 
A If the Insurer or the Named Insured cancels or refuses to renew this Policy, then the Named Insured shall have the right, upon 
payment of the appropriate percentage of the lul l annual premium", as provided in section II B, to an extension of the coverage 
granted by this Policy with respect to any Claim first made and reported during the appropriate period of months after the date upon 
which the Policy Period ends but only with respect to any Wrongful Act fully occurring prior to the end or the Policy Period and 
otherwise covered by this Policy Such appropriate period of months shall be referred to as the Extended Reporting Period As 
used herein, lul l annual premium" means the premium level in effect immediately prior to the end of the Policy Period The rights 
contained in this paragraph shall terminate, however, unless written notice of such election together with the additional premium 
due is received by the Insurer within 30 days of the effective date of cancellation or non-renewal 
B The percentage of the lul l annual oremium" and period of months for the Extended Reporting Period shall be 
1 12 months Extended Reporting Period for 40 percent of the "full annual premium' of the Policy, or 
2 24 months Extended Reporting Period for 75 percent of the lu l l annual premium" of the Policy, or 
3 36 months Extended Reporting Period for 100 percent of the "full annual premium" of the Policy 
C The additional premium for the Extended Reporting Period shall be fully earned at the inception of the Extended Reporting Period 
The Extended Reporting Period is not cancelable 
D Without any additional premium being required, there shall be an automatic extension of the coverage granted by this Policy with 
respect to an/ Claim first made and reported dunng a period of 60 days after the date upon which the Policy Period ends, bui only 
with respect to any Wrongful Act fully occurring prior to the end of the Policy Period and otherwise covered by this Policy and only if 
there is no other policy or policies that would otherwise provide insurance for such Wrongful Act This 60 day penod shall be referred 
to as the Automatic Extended Reporting Period 
III. Definitions 
Whenever printed in boldface type in this Poky, the following terms shall have the meanings indicated below 
A 'Claim(s)" means a written demand for monetary or non-monetary relief including, but not limited to, a civil, criminal, administrative 
or arbitration proceeding, provided, however, that the term Claim shall not include labor or grievance aroitration subject to a 
collective bargaining agreement A Claim shall be deemed to have been first made at the time notice of the Claim is first received 
by any insured 
B "Costs of Defense" means reasonable and necessary fees, cosrs and expenses (mcluamg premiums for any appeal bond, 
attachment bond or similar bond, but without any obligation to apply for or furnish any such bond) resulting solely from the 
investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal or any Claim against the Insureds, out excluding salaries, wages, overhead or 
benefit expenses associated with any Insureds, or any amount covered by the duty to defend obligation of any other insurer 
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C 'Damages' means a monetary judgment (including back pay and front pay), award or settlement, pre-judgment interest and post-
judgment interest, provided, however, Damages shall not include. 
1 taxes (provided, however, that the Insurer will reimburse an Insured Entity for any employer share of payroll taxes on 
any portion of damages or settlements which constitute backpay otherwise considered Damages), civil or criminal fines, 
or penalties imposed by law, or 
2 payment of insurance, disability, pension, health or other plan benefits claimed by or on behalf of any Individual 
insured, or that a claimant would have been entitled to as an Individual Insured had the Named Insured provided the 
claimant with a continuation of insurance, or 
3 costs incurred by any Insured to make any building or property more accessible or accommodating to any disabled 
person, or 
4 amounts owed under federal, state or local wage and hour laws, provided, however, Damages shall include amounts 
owed under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, or 
5 commissions, bonuses, profit sharing or severance payment, or 
6 future wages or benefits of any reinstated Individual Insured or wages or benefits associated with \he continued 
employment of an Individual Insured, or 
7 any matter deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this Policy shall be construed 
Damages also means liquidated, punitive or exemplary damages, or any multiplied damages award in excess of the amount so 
multiplied, where insurable Such coverage for liquidated, punitive, exemplary or multiolied damages is part of and not in addition to 
the Limits of Liability, and any payment of such damages shall serve to reduce the Limits of Liability Only for the purpose of 
resolving any dispute oetween the Insurer and the Insured regarding whether such liquidated, punitive, exemplary or multiplied 
damages are insurable under this Policy, the law of the jurisdiction most favorable to the msuraoility of those damages shall 
control, provided that such jurisdiction (1) is where those damages were awarded or imposed, or (2) is where any Wrongful Act 
occurred tor which such damages were awarded or imposed, or (3) is where the Insured resides, is incorporated or has its 
principal place of business, or (4) is where the Insurer is incorporated or has its principal place of business 
D Individual Insured(s)" means any past present or future duly elected or appointed directors, trustees, officers, employees 
(including part time seasonal and temporary individuals), volunteers, or committee or staff members of the Insured Entity In the 
event that the insured Entity operates outside the United States, then the term Individual Insured(s) also means those titles, 
positions or capacities in such foreign Insured Entity which is equivalent to the oosition of a director, trustee or officer in a 
corporation incorporated within the United States Coverage will automatically apply to all new Individual Insureds after the Policy 
inception date 
This Policy shall cover Loss arising from a Claim made against the estates, heirs, or legal representatives of a deceased 
individual Insured, and the legal representatives of an Individual Insured in the event of incompetency, insolvency or 
bankruptcy, who were Individual Insureds at the time the Wrongful Act upon which such Claims are based were committed 
This Policy shall cover Loss arising from a Claim made against the lawful spouse (whether such status is derived by reason of 
statutory law, common law or otherwise of any applicable jurisdiction in the world) of an Individual Insured for a Claim arising 
solely out of his or her status as the spouse of an Individual Insured, including a Claim that seeks damages recoverable from 
marital community property, property jointly held by the Individual Insured and the spouse, or property transferred from the 
Individual Insured to the spouse, provided, however, that this extension shall not afford coverage for any Claim for any Wrongful 
Act of the spouse, but shall apply only to Claims arising out of Wrongful Acts of any Individual Insured 
E Insured(s)" means the Individual Insured and the Insured Entity 
F Insured Entity" means the Named insured and any Subsidiary 
G Insurer" means the entity issuing this Policy as listed on the Declarations Page 
H "Loss" means Damages and Costs of Defense 
I 'Named Insured" means the entity designated in Item t of the Declarations 
J 'Policy Period" means the period of time from the inception date shown in Item 2 of the Declarations to the earlier of the 
exoiration date shown in Item 2 of the Declarations or the effective date of cancellation of this Policy 
K 'Proposal" means the Proposal Form and any material submitted therewith 
L Personal Injury" means any actual or alleged defamation, invasion or privacy, wrongful entry, eviction, false arrest, raise 
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, infringement of copyright or trademark, unauthorized use of title, plagiarism, or 
misapproonation ot ideas 
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M. "Related Wrongful Act(s)" means Wrongful Acts which are logically or causally connected by reason of any common fact, 
circumstance, situation, transaction, casualty, event or decision 
N "Subsidiary(ies)" means an entity which qualifies as a not-for-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3), (c)(4), (c)(6), (c)(7), 
(c)(8), (c)(10), or (c)(13) of the internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as amended) and which the Insured Entity has or controls the 
right to elect or appoint more than 50 percent of the Board of Directors (or other governing body) on or before the inception of the 
Policy Period The term Subsidiary shall not mean any political committee organized pursuant to Section 432 of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 and any amendments thereto 
An entity becomes a Subsidiary when the Named insured has or controls the right to elect or appoint more than 50 percent of the 
Board of Directors (or other governing body) either directly, or indirectly through one or more of its Subsidiaries An entity ceases 
to be a Subsidiary when the Named Insured ceases to control the right to elect or appoint more than 50 percent of the Board of 
Directors (or other governing body) either directly, or indirectly through one or more of its Subsidiaries 
In all events, coverage as is afforded with respect to any Claim made against a Subsidiary or an Insured thereof shall only apply 
to any Wrongful Act committed or allegedly committed after the effective time that such Subsidiary became a Subsidiary and 
prior to the time that such Subsidiary ceased to be a Subsidiary 
0 "Wrongful Act(s)" means: 
1 any actual or alleged breach of duty, neglect, error, misstatement, misleading statement, omission or act by the Insureds 
in their respeciive capacities as such, or any matter claimed against them by reason of their status as Insureds, or 
2 any Wrongful Employment Act, or 
3 any Personal Injury 
P. "Wrongful Employment Act(s)" means any actual or alleged act by an Insured arising from an actual or potential employment 
relationship with the claimant for: 
1 discrimination or harassment because of race, color, religion, age, sex, disability, pregnancy, national origin, sexual 
orientation, marital status, or any other basis prohibited by law which results in termination of the employment 
relationship, or demotion or failure or refusal to hire or promote, or failure to accommodate an employee or potential 
employee, or denial of an employment privilege, or the taking of any adverse or differential employment action, or 
2 sexual harassment including unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct 
of a sexual nature that is made a condition of employment, is used as a basis for employment decisions, or creates an 
intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment that interferes with work performance, or 
3 termination, constructive discharge, wrongful failure to hire, wrongful demotion, retaliation, misrepresentation, infliction of 
emotional distress, defamation, invasion of privacy, humiliation, wrongful evaluation, or breach of an implied contract or 
agreement relating to employment, whether arising out of any personnel manual, policy statement or oral representation 
IV, Exclusions 
The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in connection with any Claim made against an Insured: 
A based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any way involving the gaining of any profit 
or advantage to which an Individual Insured was not legally entitled; provided, however, this exclusion shall not apply unless a 
judgment or other final adjudication adverse to any of the Individual Insureds in such Claim shall establish that such Individual 
Insured gained such profit or advantage to which an Individual Insured was not legally entitled; 
B. based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any way involving any criminal or 
deliberate fraudulent act; provided, however, this exclusion shall not apply unless a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to 
any of the Individual Insureds in such Claim shall establish that such Individual Insured committed such criminal or deliberate 
fraudulent act; 
C based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any way involving payments to an 
Individual Insured of any remuneration without the previous approval of the governing bodies of the Insured Entity, which 
payment without such previous approval shall be held to have been illegal; 
[Provided, however, that with respect to Exclusions A, B and C , the Insurer will provide a defense for any such Claims, without any liability 
by the Insurer to pay such sums that any Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as Damages ] 
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D for 
1 bodily injury, sickness, disease, death assault or battery of any person, or 
2 damage to or destruction of any tangible property, including the loss of use thereof, 
E for actual or alleged violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 as amended or any regulations 
promulgated thereunder or any similar provisions of any state or federal common law or statute, 
F by, on oehaif of, or in the right of the Insured Entity, provided, however, this exclusion does not apply to any Claim that is a 
derivative action brought or maintained on behalf of the Insured Entity, but only if such Claim is instigated and continued totally 
independent of, and totally without the solicitation of or assistance of, or active Darticipation of, or intervention of any Individual 
Insureds or the Insured Entity, 
G which is insured in whole or in part by another valid policy, except with respect to any excess beyond the amount or amounts of 
coverage under such other policy whether such other policy is stated to be primary, contributory, excess, contingent or otherwise, 
H based upon arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any way involving any Wrongful Act of 
the Individual Insureds serving in their capacities as directors, officers trustees, employees members or governors of any other 
entity other than an Insured Entity, or by reason of their status as directors, officers, trustees, employees, members or governors 
of such other entity, 
I based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any way involving any actual or alleged 
seepage, pollution or contamination of any kind, 
J based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any way involving* 
1 any Wrongful Act alleged m any claim which has been reported, or in any circumstance of which notice has been given, 
prior to the Policy Period under any other policy, or 
2 any other Wrongful Act whenever occurring, which together with a Wrongful Act which has been the subject of such 
claim or notice, would constitute Related Wrongful Acts, 
K based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any way involving any nuclear reaction, 
radiation or contamination, regardless of cause, 
L for any actual or alleged breach of any oral or written contract or agreement, provided, however, this exclusion shall not apply to 
any Claim made against any Individual Insureds or to any Claim for any actual or alleged breach of any implied contract or 
implied agreement relating to employment, whether arising out of any personnel manual, policy statement or oral representation, 
M for any Wrongful Employment Act based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any 
way involving any violation of the Worker's Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, or any similar provisions of any federal, state or local statutory 
or common law or any rules or regulations promulgated under any or the foregoing, provided, however, this exclusion shall not 
apply to any Claim for any actual or alleged retaliatory treatment of the claimant by the Insured on account of the claimant's 
exercise of rights pursuant to any such law, 
N for any Wrongful Employment Act based upon arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from or in consequence of, or in any 
way involving any obligations under any workers compensation, social security disability benefits or unemployment compensation 
law or any similar provisions of any federal, state or local statutory or common law, or any rules or regulations promulgated under 
any of the foregoing, provided, however this exclusion shall not apply to any Claim for any actual or alleged retaliatory treatment 
or the claimant by the Insured on account of the claimant's exercise of rights pursuant to any such law, 
0 for any Personal Injury based upon, ar/smg out of, directly or \ndireci\y resulting from or m consequence of, or m any way 
involving 
1 any publication or utterance concerning any organization or business enterprise or its products or services made by or at 
the direction of any Insured, or 
2 the printing of periodicals or advertising matter for a third oarty when the periodical or advertising matter is not a regular 
part of the Insured's own activities 
[The Wrongful Act of any Insured snail not be imputea to any other Insured for ihe purpose of determining the applicaoility of the 
Exclusions in this section IV ] 
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V. Limits of Liability and Deductible 
A The Limits of Liaoility stated in Item 3 of the Declarations are the limits of the insurer's liability for all Damages arising out of all 
Claims first made against the insureds during the Policy Period the Automatic Extended Reporting Penod, and the Extended 
Reporting Period (if applicable) The Limits of Liability for the Automatic Extended Reporting Penod and the Extended Reporting 
Period shall be part of, and not in addition to, the Limits of Liability for the Policy Period In the event the Limits of Liability stated in 
Item 3 of the Declarations are exhausted by payment of Damages, or the Limits or Liability has been tendered to or on behalf of 
the Insured, then any and all obligations of the Insurer hereunder shall be deemed to be completely fulfilled and extinguished 
B The maximum Limit of Liability for all Damages arising out of ail Claims under this Policy shall not exceed the aggregate Limit of 
Liability stated in item 3 B of the Declarations 
C Costs of Defense shall be separate and in addition to the applicable Limits of Liability stated in Item 3 of the Declarations 
Payment of Costs of Defense shall not reduce the applicable Limits of Liability stated in Item 3 or the Declarations 
D The Deductible amount stated in Item 4 of the Declarations shall be paid by the Named Insured and shall apply to each and every 
Claim The Deductible shall not apply to Damages, but shall only apply to Costs of Defense 
VI. Defense, Cooperation and Settlements 
A An Insured shall not admit liability for, enter into any settlement agreement, stipulate to any judgment, agree to arbitration, or incur 
Costs of Defense without the Insurer's prior written consent The Insurer's consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, provided 
that the Insurer shall be entitled to full information and all particulars it may request in order to reach a decision regarding such 
consent Any Loss incurred and settlements agreed to prior to the insurer giving its consent shall not be covered hereunder 
B The Insurer shall have the right and the duty to defend any Claim to which this insurance applies, even if any allegations of the 
Claim are groundless, false, or fraudulent The Insurer's right and duty to defend any Claim shall end when the Insurer's 
applicable Limits of Liability have been exhausted by payment of Damages, or has been tendered to, or on behalf of, the Insured, 
or to a court of competent jurisdiction 
C Each insured shall cooperate with the Insurer in the defense and settlement of any Claim, and in enforcing any right of 
contribution or indemnity against any person or organization that may be liable to the Insured at no cost to the Insurer Upon the 
request of the Insurer, the Insured shall submit to examination and interrogation, under oath if required by a representative of the 
insurer, and shall attend hearings, depositions and trials, assist in effecting settlement, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the 
attendance of witnesses, as well as giving written statement(s) to the insurer's representatives, and meeting with such 
representatives for purposes of investigation or defense, all without charge to the insurer 
D The Insurer shall not settle any Claim without the Named Insured's consent If, however, the Named Insured shall refuse to 
consent to any settlement recommended by the Insurer which is acceptable to the claimant, and shall elect to contest the Claim, 
or continue any legal, administrative, or arbitration proceedings in connection with such Claim, then the Insurer's liability for the 
Claim shall not exceed the amount for which the Claim could have been settled, including Costs of Defense incurred up to the 
date of such refusal, and 70 percent of such Loss excess of the amount for which the Claim could have been settled, it being a 
condition of this insurance that the remaining 30 percent of such Loss shall be borne by the Insureds at their own risk Such 
amounts are subject to the provisions of section V In the event that the Named Insured refuses to consent to any settlement as 
set forth in this section VI D, the Insurer's right and duty to defend such Claim shall end upon the date of such refusal 
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VH, Notice of Claim and Multiple Claims 
A As a condition precedent to their rights under this Policy an Insured shall give the Insurer written notice of any Claim 
1 in the event of a lawsuit, as soon as practicable but in no event later than 15 days after such Claim is first made, or 
2 in the event of all other Claims as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 90 days after such Claim is first made 
B If during the Policy Period or the Extended Reporting Period (if applicable) an Insureds becomes aware of any fact, circumstance 
or situation which may reasonably be expected to give rise to a Claim oeing made against any Insured and shall give written 
notice to the Insurer, as soon as practicable (but prior to the expiration of or cancellation of the Policy), of 
1 the specific fact, circumstance or situation, with lull details as to dates, persons and entities involved, and 
2 the injury or damages which may result therefrom and 
3 the circumstances by which the Insureds first became aware thereof, 
then any Claim subsequently made arising out of such fact, circumstance or situation shall be deemed to have been made when 
notice was first given to the Insurer 
C All Claims based upon or arising out of the same Wrongful Act or any Related Wrongful Acts, or one or more series of any 
similar repeated or continuous Wrongful Act or Related Wrongful Acts, shall De considered a single Claim Each Claim shall be 
deemed to be first made at the earliest of the following times 
1 when the earliest Claim arising out of such Wrongful Act or Related Wrongful Act is first made, or 
2 when notice pursuant to section VII B of a fact, circumstance or situation giving rise to such Claim is given 
D In addition to furnishing the notice as provided in sections VII A and VII B *he Insureds shall give the Insurer such information 
and cooperation as it may reasonably require and shall, as soon as practicable, furnish the Insurer with copies of reports, 
investigations, pleadings and other papers in connection therewith 
VIII. General Conditions 
A Termination of Policy and Non-Renewal 
1 This Policy shall terminate at the earliest of the following times 
a upon the receipt oy 'he Insurer of written notice of cancellation from the Named Insured, 
o upon expiration of the Policy Period as set forth in Item 2 of the Declarations, 
c at such other time as may be agreed between the Named Insured and the Insurer, or 
d 20 days after receipt by the Named Insured of the Insurer's written notice of cancellation for non-payment of 
premium 
2 The Insurer may not cancel this Policy except for non payment of any premium when due 
3 If this Policy is cancelled by the Named Insured the Insurer shall retain the customary short rate proportion of the premium 
herein Payment or tender of any unearned Dremium by the Insurer shall not be a condition precedent to the effectiveness 
or cancellation, but such payment shall be made as soon as practicable 
4 If the Insurer decides not to renew this Policy the Insurer shall provide written notice to the Named Insured at least 60 
days orior to the end or the Policy Period The notice shall include the reason tor such non-renewal 
5 Any notices to be given to the Named Insured under this section shall be provided to the Named Insured at the last known 
principal address and to its insurance agem or broker The mailing oy certified mail of such notice shall be sufficient 
B, Proposal 
The Proposal is the basis of this Policy and is incoroorated in and constitutes a par of this Policy A copy or the Proposal Form is 
attached hereto Any material submitted with the Proposal Form shall be maintained on file with the Insurer and shall be deemed ro 
be attached hereto as if phvsicaliy attached It is agreed by tne insureds that tne statement in the Proposal are their 
representations that they are material and that this Policy is issued in reliance uoon the trurh of such representations With respect to 
such statements and representations no knowledge or information oossessed by any Insureds, except for those person or persons 
who executed the Proposal Form shall be imputed to any other Insureds V any person or persons who executed the Proposal Form 
knew that such statements or representations were inaccurate or incomplete then tms Policy will be void as to all Insureds 
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C« Action Against the Insurer 
No action shall lie against the Insurer unless, as a condition precedent thereto, there shall have been full compliance with all of the 
terms of this Policy, nor until the amount of the Insureds' obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment 
against the Insureds after actual trial or by written agreement of the Insureds, the claimant and the insurer 
Any person or organization or the legal representative thereof who has secured such judgment or written agreement with the Insurer 
shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this Policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by this Policy No person or organization 
shall have any right under this Policy to join the Insurer as party to any action against the Insureds to determine the Insureds' 
liability, nor shall the insurer be impleaded by the Insureds or their legal representatives Bankruptcy or insolvency of the Insureds 
or of their estates shall not relieve the Insurer of any of its obligations hereunder 
D„ Changes in Ownership 
If during this Policy Period the Named Insured shall consolidate with or merge into, or sell ail or substantially all of its assets to any 
other person or entity or group of persons and/or entities acting in concert (herein referred to as the 'Transaction") then, this Policy 
shall continue in full force and effect as to any Wrongful Act fully occurring prior to the effective time of the Transaction, but there 
shall be no coverage afforded by any provision of this Policy for any actual or alleged Wrongful Act occurring after the effective time 
of the Transaction 
The Named Insured shall give the Insurer written notice of the Transaction as soon as practicable but not later than 30 days after the 
effective date of the Transaction 
E. Subrogation 
In the event of any payment under this Policy, the Insurer shall be subrogated to the extent of such payment to all ihe Insureds' 
rights of recovery thereof, and the Insureds shall execute all papers required and shall do everything that may be necessary to 
secure such rights including the execution of such documents necessary to enable the Insurer to effectively bring suit in the name of 
the Insureds. In no event, however, shall the Insurer exercise its rights of subrogation against an Insured under this Policy unless 
such Insured has been convicted of a criminal act, or been judicially determined to have committed a deliberate fraudulent act, or 
obtained any profit or advantage to which such Insured was not legally entitled. 
F, Assignment 
This Policy and any and all rights hereunder are not assignable without the written consent of the Insurer 
G* Entire Agreement 
By acceptance of this Policy, the Insureds and the Insurer agree that this Policy (including the Proposal) and any written 
endorsements attached hereto constitute the entire agreement between the parties 
H. Representation by Named Insured 
It is agreed that the Named Insured shall act on behalf of its Subsidiaries and all Insureds with respect to the giving and receiving of 
notices, the payment of premiums and the receiving of any return premiums that may become due under This Policy, the receipt and 
acceptance of any endorsements issued to form a part of this Policy and the exercising or declining to exercise any right to an 
Extended Reporting Period 
I. Coverage Territory 
This Policy only applies to a Wrongful Act taking place anywhere in the world 
In witness whereof, the Insurer has caused this Policy to be signed by its President and Chief Executive Officer and Secretary, but this 
Policy shall not be valid unless countersigned on the Declarations Page by a duly authorized representative of the Insurer 
President and Chief Executive Officer Secretary 
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ADDENDUM "E" 
KERSTEN COMPLAINT 
A-39 
T McKAY STERLAND (5800) 
MAJRLA R SNOW (9954) 
H1CKEN, STIRLAND & SNOW, LLC 
765 North Main Street 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Telephone: (801)798-1800 
Facsimile: (801) 798-1802 
Attorneys for Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Association, Inc 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EQUINE ASSISTED GROWTH AND 
LEARNING ASSOCIATION, INC 
Plaintiff 
vs 
LYNN THOMAS, DAVID CURRIE, MICKEY 
DIGIACOMO, LISA ROSKENS, BARBARA 
SCOTT, TIM IOBE, AMY BLOSSOM, DAVID 
TIDMARSH, RHONDA SMITH 
Defendants 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff EQUINE ASSISTED GROWTH AND LEARNING 
ASSOCIATION, INC, a Utah Non-Profit Corporation (hereinafter "EAGALA"), by and through 
counsel of record T McKay Stirland and Mark R Snow of HICKEN, STIRLAND & SNOW, 
LLC and alleges and complains against Lynn Thomas, David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
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Y 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
CivilNo Oblol^t^ 
Division 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim lobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmaish, Rhonda Smith and John 
Does 1-10 as follows: 
1 Plaintiff EAGALA is a Utah non-profit corporation and a charitable corporation under 
§501-(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, with its registered and principle office in Utah County, 
Utah 
2 The Defendant Lynn Thomas is an individual residing in Utah County, Utah 
3 The Defendants David Curiie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim 
Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmaish and Rhonda Smith have done and/or continue to do 
business in the State of Utah and Utah County in furtherance of their business interests and/or for 
their own personal benefit 
4. Plaintiff EAGALA provides equine assisted psychotherapy and related therapies and 
programs 
5 The assets and resources of EAGALA are principally located in Utah County, Utah 
Certain of these assets and resources are located in Utah County, Utah and are in the control of 
Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, 
Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmaish and Rhonda Smith 
6 Greg Kersten is an individual residing in Utah County, Utah 
7 Greg Kersten is the founder of EAGALA He is also a member of EAGALA 
8 Greg Kersten is, and all times relevant hereto, the President and CEO of EAGALA 
9 Greg Kersten is, and at all times relevant hereto, a Board Member of EAGALA. 
10 Greg Kersten is, and at all tunes relevant hereto, the Chairman of the Board of 
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Trustees of EAGALA 
11 Pursuant to the ByLaws of EAGALA, Greg Kersten as President shall control the 
business and affairs of EAGALA 
12 Greg Keisten is one of two members of the Executive Committee of EAGALA 
13 Pursuant to the Bylaws of EAGALA, its Executive Committee shall function for the 
orderly conduct of any business of the Corporation. 
14 Gieg Kersten developed the training, techniques and programs used by EAGALA for 
its business purposes and upon which its entire success is founded 
15 Gteg Kersten is the primary and fundamental element of EAGALA, its reputation, its 
viability and its success 
16 Defendant Lynn Thomas acknowledged that Greg Kersten is the "creator and 
creative genius behind EAGALA " 
17 Defendant Lynn Thomas acknowledged that Greg Kersten does "all the trainings" for 
EAGALA 
18 Defendant Lynn Thomas acknowledged that she is not the originator of EAGALA 
nor any of the concepts, programs or procedures it uses 
19 Defendant Lynn Thomas has served as a Trustee of EAGALA and its COO 
20 Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim 
Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith hold themselves out to be Trustees of 
EAGALA 
21 EAGALA was incorporated by Greg Kersten and Lynn Thomas 
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22 EAGALA's Articles of Incorporation were filed with the State of Utah on July 7, 
1999 
23 Upon information and belief, Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David 
Cuirie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David 
Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have knowingly and intentionally piovided information to others 
that is false and/or misleading regarding EAGALA and its Director, President and CEO 
24 Upon information and belief, Defendant Lynn Thomas and/oi Defendants David 
Curiie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David 
Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have wrongfully attempted and continue to attempt to undermine 
the purposes, resources and viability of EAGALA and its Director, President and CEO 
25 Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Cuirie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, .Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have 
knowingly and intentionally and wrongfully attempted and continue to attempt and prevent 
EAGALA's Director, President and CEO fiom performing his duties and responsibilites. 
26 Upon information and belief, Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David 
Curiie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David 
Tidmaish and Rhonda Smith have wrongfully caused the misappropriation, withdrawal and/or 
transfer of EAGALA funds fiom its long standing bank account with Central Bank to another 
bank account or financial institution 
27 Upon information and belief, Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David 
Curiie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David 
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Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have wrongfully caused revenue of EAGALA to be diverted from 
EAGALA accounts 
28 Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim lobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have 
wrongfully attempted to remove EAGALA's Director, President and CEO from EAGALA's 
bank account and make other changes to such account 
29 On or about November 10-11, 2005, Defendant Lynn Thomas and/oi Defendants 
David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David 
Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have wrongfully closed EAGALA credit card accounts and/or 
removed and/or prevented EAGALA and its Director, President and CEO fiom access to such 
credit cards Such credit cards include but are not limited to: a Mastercard and an American 
Express Card On or about November 5, 2005, Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants 
David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim lobe, Amy Blossom, David 
Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith wrongfully closed EAGALA accounts at certain retail stores and/or 
have prevented EAGALA and/or its Director, President and CEO fiom access to such accounts 
30 Defendant Lynn Thomas and or Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have 
wrongfully changed the locks on the registered and principal offices of EAGALA, preventing 
and depriving EAGALA and its Director, President and CEO access to, control and possession of 
such offices, equipment and assets located therein 
31 Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
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Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith engaged 
the services of an independent consultant and wrongfully caused Greg Kersten to believe that it 
was wrong and illegal for him to serve as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of EAGALA 
and to be paid by EAGALA for services and expertise rendered to EAGALA outside of his 
duties as Chairman of the Board of Directors 
a Such representations by Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Currie, 
Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim lobe, Amy Blossom, David 
Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith were intentional, false and/or misleading, and were made to 
induce Gieg Kersten to resign as Chauman of the Board of Directors 
b Any alleged resignation by Greg Kersten as the Chairman of the Board of Directors is 
invalid 
32 Upon information and belief, Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim lobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have 
knowingly and intentionally provided information to the others that is false and/or misleading 
about EAGALA and its Director, President and CEO 
33 EAGALA and its President and CEO have been deprived and continue to be deprived 
and prevented from possessing, controlling and managing EAGALA's business, assets and 
resources 
34 Upon information and belief, Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David 
Curae, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David 
Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have intentionally interfered with the contractual and business 
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relations of EAGALA 
35 Upon information and belief, Defendant Lynn Thomas and/oi Defendants David 
Cunie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David 
Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have intentionally interfered with the business opportunities of 
EAGALA 
36 Defendant Lynn Thomas and/oi Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim lobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have 
attempted and continue to attempt to convert the assets and/or resources and or business relations 
and/or business opportunities of EAGALA for their own personal use and benefit 
37 The actions of Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Cunie, Mickey 
DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim lobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and 
Rhonda Smith have damaged and continue to damage the reputation, viability, business 
opportunities and business relations of EAGALA and its President and CEO 
38 Upon information and belief, Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David 
Cunie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David 
Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have intentionally damaged the reputations of EAGALA and its 
President, CEO and Chairman of the Board Greg Kersten 
39 Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Cunie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have 
knowingly and wiongly interfered and continue to interfere with EAGALA's contractual and 
business relations 
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40 Defendant Lynn Thomas and/oi Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim lobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmaish and Rhonda Smith have 
knowingly and wrongly interfered and continue to interfere with the employment and terms of 
employment of EAGALA employees 
41 EAGALA is entitled to an award of damages of in an amount to be proved at trial, 
but not less than $100,000.00, or such other amounts as may be determined by the Court, to an 
immediate order requiring Defendant Lynn Thomas and Defendants David Currie, Mickey 
DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Baibara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmaish and 
Rhonda Smith immediately cease interfering with EAGALA's contractual and business 
opportunities 
42 Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have and 
continue to knowingly and intentionally act inconsistently with the Bylaws and Articles of 
Incorporation of EAGALA 
43 Defendant Lynn Thomas and Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmaish and Rhonda Smith have 
failed and continue to knowingly and intentionally fail to act in good faith regarding EAGALA 
and its Director, President and CEO 
44 Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have and 
continue to knowingly and intentionally act contrary to the best interests of EAGALA 
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45 The actions of Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Cunie, Mickey 
DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim lobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and 
Rhonda Smith constitute interference with EAGALA's contractual and business relations 
46 Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Cunie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith have 
knowingly and wrongly interfered and continue to interfere with EAGALAJs contractual and 
business opportunities 
47 The actions of Defendant Lynn Thomas and Defendants David Cunie, Mickey 
DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and 
Rhonda Smith constitute interference with EAGALA's contractual and business opportunities 
48 Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Cunie, Mickey DiGiacomo. Lisa 
Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmaish and Rhonda Smith have 
breached and/or failed to perform the duties of their offices with EAGALA Such actions were 
willful misconduct and/or intentional 
49 Defendant Lynn Thomas' actions and/oi the actions of the Defendants David Cunie, 
Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and 
Rhonda Smith create and cause continuing irreparable harm and damages to EAGALA and its 
Director, President and CEO 
50 It is in the best inteiests of EAGALA that Defendant Lynn Thomas and Defendants 
David Cunie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David 
Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith be removed as an agent, officer, director or trustee of EAGALA 
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51 EAGALA is entitled to an order of the removal and termination of Defendant Lynn 
Thomas and/or Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim 
Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith as an agent, officer, director or trustee 
of EAGALA 
52 EAGALA is entitled to an award of damages of in amount to be proved at trial, but 
not less than $100,000 00, or such other amounts as may be determined by the Court, to an 
immediate order requiring Defendant Lynn Thomas and Defendants David Cuirie, Mickey 
DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and 
Rhonda Smith immediately cease interfering with EAGALA's contractual and business relations 
and to an immediate order requiring Defendant Lynn Thomas and/or Defendants David Currie, 
Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and 
Rhonda Smith to cease fiom interfering in any way with Greg Kersten's control of EAGALA's 
business and affairs 
WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant Lynn Thomas and 
Defendants David Currie, Mickey DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy 
Blossom, David Tidmarsh and Rhonda Smith as fbllows: 
1 For an Order of the Court finding conversion by Defendant(s) of the assets and 
resources of Plaintiff, an award to Plaintiff against the Defendant(s) for its damages, costs and 
attorney's fees, and for an immediate order permanently preventing Defendant(s) fiom 
converting Plaintiffs assets and business opportunities 
2 Foi an Order of the Court finding interference with Plaintiffs contractual and business 
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relations by Defendant(s), an award to Plaintiff against Defendant(s) for its damages, costs and 
attorney's fees, and an immediate order permanently preventing Defendant(s) ftom interfering 
with Plaintiff's contractual and business relations 
3 For an Order of the Court finding interference with Plaintiffs contractual and business 
opportunities by Defendant(s), an award to Plaintiff against Defendant(s) for its damages, costs 
and attorney's fees, and an immediate order permanently preventing Defendants) ftom 
interfering with Plaintiff's contractual and business opportunities 
4 For a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary injunction and Permanent Injunction 
enjoining and restraining the Defendant(s) as follows: 
a Requiring Defendant Lynn Thomas and Defendants David Currie, Mickey 
DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim fobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh and 
Rhonda Smith to immediately return possession and control of any and all assets and 
resources of the Plaintiff to its President and CEO Greg Kersten 
b Instruction to all appropriate law enforcement officers to cooperate with the 
Plaintiff and its Director, President and CEO Greg Kersten in regaining immediate 
possession and control of any and all assets and resources of the Plaintiff 
c Requiring Defendant(s) to immediately stop and cease ftom making 
representations to any person that the Defendants, or any of them, represent Plaintiff or in 
any war are entitled to act on Plaintiffs behalf 
5 For and Order of the Court removing and/or terminating the Defendant(s) as an agent, 
officer, director or trustee of Plaintiff 
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6 Foi such other relief as this Court deems just and equitable under the ciicumstances. 
DATED this ) 7 day of November, 2005 
Equine Assisted Giowth and Learning Association, 
Inc. 
GREG KER^TEN, President and CEO 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
Gieg Kersten, after first being duly sworn, deposes and says: That I have read the 
foregoing Veiified Complaint and the same is tiue to the best of my knowledge and as to those 
matters state upon information and belief, I believe the same to be tine 
Equine Assisted Giowth and Learning Association, 
Inc 
GREG KERSTEN, President and CEO 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
/ ^ ft ®n the / / day of November, 2005, peisonally appeared before me, Greg Kersten, the 
signer of the foregoing Veiified Complaint, who duly acknowledged to me that he is the 
President and CEO of Equine Assisted Giowth and Learning Association, Inc., that is authoiized 
to act on its behalf and that he executed the foiegoing 
T MCKAY SnRLAND 
NOTARY PUBUC • STATE of UTAH 
1483 S 11O0E 
SPANISH FORK UT 84660 
COMM. EXP. 08-31-2008 
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HICKEN, STIRLAND & SNOW, LLC 
N D 7 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Equine Assisted Growth and 
Leaining Association, Inc 
TMcKAYST 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the /J~ day of January, 2010, two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed, first class, postage 
pre-paid to: 
James L. Harris, Jr. 
556 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
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